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On December 20, 1991, GAIT Director-General Arthur Dunkel issued a text
in the Uruguay Round multilateral trade negotiations, begun in 1986. The
Dunkel text covers nearly the full gambit of trade negotiations, from intellectual
property, services, and investment to agriculture, textiles, subsidies, dumping,
and preshipment inspection. The only major subject not covered is market access
agreements for both products and services.
This article reviews the major modifications proposed to current GAIT rules
concerning dispute settlement. While, as of this writing, the Dunkel text has not
been accepted, major changes are not expected in the dispute settlement area. It
is timely, then, to review how the Dunkel regime could be expected to work and
how it presumably would affect use of the major U.S. trade remedy to open
foreign markets, section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.
I. The Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes
At the 1988 Midterm Review in the Uruguay Round multilateral trade nego-
tiations, as reported earlier in this series,' Contracting Parties of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)2 negotiated and agreed to implement,
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1. Alan F. Holmer & Judith H. Bello, Settling Disputes in the GATT: The Past, Present and
Future, 24 INT'L LAw. 519 (1990).
2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 1987 [hereinafter GATT].
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ad referendum, major procedural improvements to the GATT rules for settling
disputes. However, negotiations continued for the next three years on more
substantive reforms.
On December 20, 1991, GATT Director-General Arthur Dunkel, exercising
his leadership, issued a nearly comprehensive text designed to jumpstart the long
stalemated negotiations. In the agricultural negotiating group, the heavily sub-
sidizing European Communities, the United States, and the so-called Cairns
Group of agricultural exporting nations repeatedly failed to breach the impasse
in negotiations. Led by Dunkel, the GATT Secretariat resolved differences to the
best of its ability and, by issuing a text without brackets (which are used to
denote disagreement), illustrated how tantalizingly close the Contracting Parties
were to a dramatic strengthening of the international trading system.
Among many other agreements in the nearly 500-page text the Dunkel doc-
ument includes an Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Set-
tlement of Disputes (Understanding). 3 Under GATT dispute settlement proce-
dures a Contracting Party complaining about the actions of another Contracting
Party first requests consultations. If those consultations fail to achieve a mutually
satisfactory result, the complaining party may request the establishment of a
panel to investigate the complaint and make recommendations to the GATT
Council. In the 1988 Midterm Review, Contracting Parties adopted ad referen-
dum new procedures designed principally to expedite these stages of dispute
settlement. 4
Under the current system, the complaining party has no opportunity for appeal
once the panel issues its report. However, the report technically has no legal
effect or formal status unless and until it is adopted by the GATT Council (all the
Contracting Parties). A single Contracting Party-including the party whose
actions are the subject of the dispute-can block adoption of the report by
formally objecting to it.
Even if a report is adopted by the GATT Council, the complaining party has
no assurance that the offending party will either come into conformity with its
GATT obligations (by withdrawing the offending measures or compensating
adversely affected trading partners) or suffer the consequences (GATT-
authorized retaliation against its trade, to restore the balance of concessions).
Actions found either to violate the GATT or to nullify and impair benefits
reasonably anticipated from the GATT can continue indefinitely, with no auto-
matic or even clear recourse for the Contracting Party that "won" its legal case
but continues to lose trade benefits. Moreover, in the unusual event that a Con-
tracting Party seeks GAIT authorization to retaliate against a delinquent trading
3. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement ofDisputes under Articles
XXII and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Section S attached to GATT
MTN.TNC/W/FA (Dec. 20, 1991) [hereinafter Understanding].
4. Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, 28 I.L.M. 1031-34
(1989).
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partner, an effective, credible procedure to quantify the adverse trade effects to
establish the level of retaliation does not exist.
The Understanding addresses these remaining deficiencies of the current pro-
cedures. First, it provides for automatic establishment of a panel5 and automatic
adoption by the GATT Council of a panel report, 6 unless the Council, by con-
sensus, decides to the contrary. A recalcitrant Contracting Party seeking to delay
and avoid the resolution of a dispute would no longer be able to do so.
Second, the Understanding provides an opportunity for appellate review. It
establishes a seven-member standing appellate body, three of whom would be
empaneled to hear a particular case. 7 An appeal is limited to issues of law, and
an appellate report is automatically adopted by the GATT Council unless the
Council decides, by consensus, not to adopt it.
8
Third, the Understanding focuses on the surveillance of implementation of
adopted panel reports. It stresses the importance of prompt compliance and
ensures that a period of time is established (by arbitration, if necessary9) for
adoption of the GATT's recommendations and rulings.' 0 Moreover, it requires
the GAT Council to review the implementation of recommendations and rulings
by including them on the agenda of the Council meeting six months following the
establishment of the reasonable period for compliance and at each subsequent
meeting until the issue is resolved. 11 At least ten days before each such meeting,
the GATT Contracting Party concerned must provide the Council with a written
status report of its progress in implementing the recommendations or rulings.
The Understanding provides that compensation and the suspension of conces-
sions are temporary measures available when a Contracting Party does not con-
form with its GATT obligations within the specified time period. 12 In the absence
of such conformity or agreement on compensation the Understanding provides
for automatic approval by the GATT Council of a request for authorization to
suspend concessions (to retaliate) unless the Council decides, by consensus, to
reject the request. 13 Moreover, in the event of any disagreement about the level
of suspension proposed, the matter is referred to expeditious arbitration. 1
4
Finally, the Understanding requires Contracting Parties seeking redress of a
practice they consider a GAFF violation (or a nullification and impairment of
GAFF benefits) to have recourse to, and abide by, the GATT dispute settlement
procedures.' 5 In such cases Contracting Parties are prohibited from making their
5. Understanding, supra note 3, para. 4.1, at S.6.
6. Id. para. 14.4, at S.12.
7. Id. para. 15.1, at S.13.
8. Id. para. 15.14, at S.14.
9. Id. para. 19.3(c), at S.15.
10. Id. para. 19.3.
11. Id. para. 19.6.
12. Id. para. 20.1, at S.16.
13. Id. para. 20.3, at S. 17.
14. Id. para. 21.1, at S.18.
15. Id. para. 21.1, at S.18.
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own determinations whether their rights have been violated or nullified and
impaired.' 6 Moreover, they are required to follow the GATT procedures to
determine both the reasonable period of time for compliance 17 and the level at
which they propose to suspend concessions. 18
Through these reforms the Understanding dramatically enhances the credibil-
ity of GATT procedures for settling disputes effectively and expeditiously. A
government whose policies contravene its GATT obligations or nullify and im-
pair GATI" benefits can neither run nor hide from its responsibilities. If a com-
plaining Contracting Party requests the establishment of a GATT panel, it will be
established promptly and will render a report that the Council is virtually certain
to adopt. If the panel report is regarded as aberrant, an appeal may be taken. The
Council will call upon the offending government to provide the GATT" written
reports of its progress in implementing the recommendations or rulings within
the reasonable time period established by agreement or arbitration. If it fails to
implement the recommendations or rulings or provide adequate compensation
within the reasonable period of time for compliance, then the GATT Council is
virtually certain to authorize the complaining party to suspend concessions.
While these reforms are impressive, what effect will they have on the U.S.
section 301 program?
II. Relationship Between the Understanding
and Section 301 of U.S. Trade Law
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, 19 is the principal trade
remedy aimed at enforcing U.S. rights under trade agreements, opening foreign
markets to U.S. goods and services, and improving foreign protection of intel-
lectual property rights. It enables private parties in the United States to petition
the U.S. Trade Representative to initiate an investigation of foreign government
acts, policies, and practices that violate a trade agreement or are otherwise
actionable under section 301. If the U.S. Trade Representative determines that a
foreign government practice violates a trade agreement, she must take responsive
action unless a statutorily specified exception applies.20
Section 301 originated primarily as a means of enforcing U.S. rights under the
GATT. However, over time a major use of section 301 has been as a credible
16. Id. para. 21.2(a), at S.18.
17. Id. para. 21.2(b).
18. ld.para. 21.2(c).
19. Trade Act of 1974, § 301 (as amended), Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978, 2041 (1975)
(codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101, 2411 (1988)) [hereinafter Trade Act], in particular as amended by
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 1301, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107,
1164-76 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411 et seq. (1988)).
20. See generally Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Unilateral Exercises to Open Foreign
Markets: The Mechanics of Retaliation Exercises, 22 INr'L LAW. 1197 (1988); Judith H. Bello &
Alan F. Holmer, Significant Recent Developments in Section 301 Unfair Trade Cases, 21 INT'L LAW.
211 (1987).
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threat of U.S. retaliation to increase pressure on a foreign government to adopt
reforms not required by the GATT. For example, section 301 has been used to
achieve adequate and effective protection abroad of intellectual property
rights-a subject only peripherally addressed in the current GATT (although the
Dunkel text last December includes an Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights21).
However, where the subject of a section 301 petition involves the GATT,
current law requires the Trade Representative to request proceedings on the
matter under GATT dispute settlement procedures. 22 While section 301 does not
require the Trade Representative to conform her unfairness determination 23 with
that of a GATT dispute settlement panel ,24 the Office of the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative (USTR) has never found a practice to be unfair following a GATT
determination that it was fair, or vice versa.
What, then, would be the effect of the Understanding on section 301? Argu-
ably the Understanding internationalizes section 301 by providing dramatically
more effective international enforcement against unfair traders. By providing for
automatic establishment of panels and adoption of panel reports, arbitration if
needed (as regards the reasonable period for implementation and the appropriate
level of suspension of concessions), strict surveillance of implementation, and
near-automatic GATT authorization for retaliation, it makes the GATT25 a more
powerful international cop. By increasing the prospect of effective and expedi-
tious enforcement against GATT offenders, the Understanding, like section 301,
may deter GATT offenses. If not, it at least restores a reasonable balance of
rights and obligations.
While the Understanding is unquestionably a boon for GATT plaintiffs, it is
conversely a bane for defendants. Any action that violates GATT obligations or
nullifies and impairs GATT benefits may be the subject of relatively prompt
GATT action, resulting in GATT recommendations for the offending party to
withdraw the objectionable measures. A recalcitrant party refusing to shoulder its
obligations and implement the recommendations, and unable (or unwilling) to
compensate adversely affected Contracting Parties, faces the prospect of virtu-
ally assured retaliation with the full sanction of the GATT.
Consequently, while the Understanding internationalizes section 301, it also
somewhat diminishes the credibility of the threat of unilateral retaliation by the
21. Understanding, supra note 3, at 57, Annex Ill. While the Dunkel "TRIPS" text represents
significant progress, key U.S. private sector interests consider it seriously flawed (e.g., by unduly
long transition periods for developing countries and lack of "pipeline" protection for existing
patented subject matter).
22. Trade Act § 303(a)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2).
23. That is, the determination whether the acts, policies, and practices of a foreign government
are actionable under section 301.
24. See generally Trade Act § 304, 19 U.S.C. § 2414.
25. If the Uruguay Round is concluded and implemented, the GATT may be called instead the
Multilateral Trade Organization.
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United States under section 301. Any such retaliation-consisting in all cases to
date of either an increase in duties or imposition of quantitive restrictions on
imported goods-is likely to be in violation of GATT articles 1,26 11,27 or XI, or
all three. 28 If the United States takes such action without GATT authorization,
then it is likely to be challenged. And, if challenged, the United States' retali-
ation is likely to be found in violation of the GATT.
Of course, this is true under existing GATT rules. Already, unilateral U.S.
increases in bound tariffs or imposition of quotas, if challenged under current
GATT dispute settlement procedures, are likely to be found by a panel to violate
the GATT. Under the Understanding, however, a panel report adverse to the
United States could not be blocked by the United States alone.29 Further, a
reasonable period for compliance would be established (if not by agreement, then
through arbitration), and the GATT would monitor U.S. progress in implement-
ing the recommendations of an adopted GATT panel report. Current GAIT rules
arguably deter the use of unilateral retaliation in violation of the GATT. The
significantly improved procedures for dispute settlement provided in the Under-
standing would further erode the already circumscribed credibility of threats of
unilateral action by the United States under section 301 (or by any other Con-
tracting Party under national law).
Does that mean that the Understanding would require the United States to
eliminate section 301? It definitely would not. Section 301 could continue to be
used, consistently with the GATT, as the complement in U.S. domestic law to
international legal action in the GAIT under the dispute settlement procedures.
To a large degree it would function as the U.S. private sector's insurance policy
that the United States Government would use the dispute settlement procedures
aggressively against foreign governments engaged in unfair practices.
Would the United States be precluded from using section 301 unilaterally
without GAIT authorization? It definitely would not. As a sovereign nation the
26. Article I provides most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment, under which no Contracting Party
may be treated less favorably than other Contracting Parties with respect to, inter alia, customs duties
and charges.
27. Article II generally prohibits any increase in duties beyond the levels agreed to in schedules
of tariff concessions.
28. Article XI generally prohibits quotas, subject to specified exceptions.
29. However, the legal right to block adoption of an adverse GATT panel report does not
necessarily ensure that such right will be exercised indefinitely in the face of united international
condemnation of a particular practice. For example, in 1988 a GAIT panel ruled that section 337 of
the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1337, denied national treatment as required
by GATT article l. The U.S. blockage was ultimately determined to outweigh its benefits. Reluc-
tantly, in November 1989, the United States permitted the report to be adopted. The United States
clarified that it did not approve the report, and would implement the report in the context of a
satisfactory agreement on trade-related intellectual property rights. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep-
resentative, Ambassador Hills Announces GATT Council's Adoption of Panel Report on Section 337
(Nov. 7, 1989) (on file at the office of the U.S. Trade Representative). Memorandum for the United
States Trade Representative on Enforcement of Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 25 WEEKLY
COMP. PREs. Doc. 1699 (Nov. 7, 1989).
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United States would retain the legal right to take actions inconsistent with its
GATT obligations. However, the Understanding would be more likely than the
current GATT rules to preclude the United States (and all other GATT Contract-
ing Parties) from doing so "for free." If challenged, U.S. action adversely
affecting a GATT Contracting Party and inconsistent with the GATT-no matter
how well intended, or trade-liberalizing in its ultimate effect-would likely
result in GATI authorization for retaliation against the United States. While this
could happen as well under current GATI rules, it is more likely to happen, and
more quickly, under the Understanding.
For example, suppose the United States and U.S. private parties complained
that a developing country failed to provide any patent protection for certain
chemical products. While the Dunkel text includes an intellectual property agree-
ment, it expressly allows developing countries five years to implement the agree-
ment in general. And it permits ten years with respect to patent protection for
certain chemical products. Thus, the United States would have no basis to
complain in the GATT of inadequate action by a developing country to provide
such protection during the ten-year period. On the other hand, if the United
States initiated a section 301 proceeding against such country, the developing
country presumably would not consider the threat of retaliation credible because
retaliation through tariff increases or quotas probably would violate the GATT
and lead to GATT authorization for the developing country to retaliate against the
United States.
Even so, in the future the United States could continue to use section 301
unilaterally in selected cases. Where the domestic political pressure is great
enough, the U.S. administration may be prepared to suffer the international
consequences. Moreover, section 301's threat of retaliation may remain credible
in cases in which geopolitical developments or other bilateral factors make a
trading partner willing to accept, however reluctantly, U.S.-advocated trade
reforms. While access to the American market is one of the U.S. administra-
tion's major sources of leverage in trade negotiations, it is certainly not the only
arrow in the U.S. quiver. Trading partners will continue to value other U.S.
actions (for example, support for a U.N. resolution or a candidate for office in
an international organization; a favorable response to developments in a foreign
capital; support for a head of state's agenda or proposal for an international
plenipotentiary conference).
III. Conclusion
The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes in the Dunkel text of December 1991 is a quantum leap forward for
effective and expeditious resolution of international trade disputes. While the
Understanding does not preclude sovereign Contracting Parties from occasion-
ally disregarding their GATT obligations, it ensures that the international com-
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munity responds swiftly (at least in international terms) to restore the balance of
rights and obligations among trading partners. In this regard, the Understanding
will be a valuable asset to the United States in its efforts to eliminate GATT-
illegal practices of other GATT Contracting Parties.
However, the Understanding also could further hamper U.S. efforts to elim-
inate unfair practices that do not violate the GATT by using the credible threat of
unilateral retaliation under section 301 of the Trade Act. While unilaterally
imposed tariff increases and quotas may violate the present GATT rules, a losing
party today may delay and retard any effective response by the Contracting
Parties. Under the Understanding, however, any losing party that fails to shoul-
der its obligations within a reasonable period of time is likely to face the prospect
of retaliation against its trade with the express authorization of the GAIT.
If the Understanding is ultimately accepted and implemented, the United
States must be prepared to live with the international trade rules that it negotiates.
Although current GATT rules limit the ability of the United States in many
circumstances to achieve a better result bilaterally through the threat of unilateral
action under section 301, the Understanding would further erode the credibility
and, therefore, the effectiveness of such retaliation threats.
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